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RANGERS, MOUNTIES, AND THE SUBJUGATION
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 1870 .. 1885

ANDREW R. GRAYBILL

During the 1840s and 1850s, more than
300,000 traders and overland emigrants followed the Platte and Arkansas rivers westward across the Central Plains, the winter
habitat of the bison. The rapid environmental
degradation of this area had the ·effect of driving the bison to the extreme Northern and
Southern Plains, where white hidehunters
slaughtered the animals.! By the mid-1870s
indigenous peoples at both ends of the grasslands, in places such as the Texas Panhandle
and the upper Missouri River valley, fiercely
defended the dwindling herds in an attempt
to avoid starvation. 2

The Indians' predicament was not theirs
alone, however, as Native efforts at self-preservation posed a significant threat to EuroAmerican plans for the frontier. To that end,
government officials on the peripheries of the
Great Plains developed a remarkably similar
strategy: the use of mounted constabularies to
pacify indigenous peoples. Indeed, the NorthWest Mounted Police were created and the
Texas Rangers renewed and reorganized in the
early 1870s specifically to address the pressing
"native question" confronting Texas and western Canada, among the few places where bison still roamed after 1870. Of course,
'authorities in Austin and Ottawa relied on
other armed forces to wrest control of their
hinterlands away from indigenous peoplesmost notably the US Army and the Canadian
militia-but no two groups rendered more effective service in this regard than the Rangers
and the Mounted Police. 3
Few scholars have situated the efforts of
these constabularies within the context of the
rapidly changing conditions for Indians on the
Great Plains after 1865. Studies of the Rangers tend to regard their post-Civil War antiIndian vigilance as merely the continuation
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of an inevitable conflict between incompatible cultures, while Canadian historians have
overlooked the more coercive dimensions of
the Mounties' duties, especially in the 1870s. 4
An examination of the two forces, however,
reveals that both Austin and Ottawa called
on their rural police to manage indigenous
populations facing societal collapse, and that
the constabularies responded in similar fashion: by controlling or denying the Natives'
access to the bison.
Though fought almost entirely to the east of
Texas, the Civil War was nevertheless costly
for the state, as it lost some of its leading antebellum political figures. 5 More disturbing, perhaps, was the recession of the frontier, a
byproduct of the manpower needs of the Confederacy, which had left Texas unable to defend itself from Indian attacks, long a feature
of Anglo-Native relations in the state. Given
the instability of the Civil War era in Texas,
the violence of this period was among the worst
that the state's population had yet endured,
with one historian estimating that over 400
residents were killed, wounded, or taken captive between 1862 and 1865 alone. 6
With the end of the war, however, Austin
turned its attention once again to the nagging
problem of Native depredations, which, if anything, seemed to be growing worse after 1865.
In north Texas, settlers complained frequently
of Kiowa and Comanche raids emanating from
the Indian Territory just across the Red River. 7
It would be difficult to overstate the anxiety
caused in Austin by such missives, as state
officials worried that the violence, if unchecked, would halt migration to west Texas,
a concern voiced explicitly by a number of
whites. s
Texans were not alone in their dire assessments of the circumstances along the frontier,
as several federal officials dispatched to the
region commented on the adverse effects of
Native violence on white settlers. One such
observer was Lawrie Tatum, the Indian agent
at Fort Sill in the Indian Territory. Tatum,
however, sounded a slightly more optimistic

note than did Texas residents, noting that the
Comanche responsible for the raids were "fast
passing away," and that unless they soon chose
a more civilized path, "it is not likely they will
last much beyond the present generation."9
Tatum's letter is particularly useful in evoking the climate along the state's northern and
western frontiers, for it suggests that white
settlers were not the only residents of the
Southern Plains experiencing great hardships
following the Civil War. Like many of the
settlers, though, Tatum seems not to have recognized the powerful correlative relationship
between the sufferings of both Anglos and
Indians at this time. White insecurities
stemmed directly from the Natives' own dilemmas and shaped Austin's strategies to secure the Texas frontier.
The Comanche who raided in northern
Texas during the nineteenth century were
descendants of the group's eastern branch,
which had migrated to Texas from presentday Colorado in the mid-eighteenth century.
The Kotsoteka-or "buffalo eaters"-hunted
elk, black bear, deer, and antelope, but as their
name suggests, their principal means of subsistence was the bison. 1O By the early 1800s
the Kotsoteka were in full control of the bison-hunting grounds below the Canadian
River, and Comanche bands ranged as far into
Texas as the Hill Country, located in the central part of the state. ll
Hunting alongside the Comanche were the
Kiowa, who-despite cultural and linguistic
differences-had forged an extremely close
alliance with the Comanche during the late
eighteenth century. 12 Like the Comanche, the
Kiowa inhabited the grasslands south of the
Arkansas River, developing a cultural and economic reliance on the region's bison, whose
numbers-estimated by Dan Flores at approximately eight million-must have seemed inexhaustible to the Indians during the first half
of the nineteenth century.13 Such was not the
case, however.
By the early 1860s a combination of human
and ecological factors had reduced the number
of bison. 14 Compounding matters for the Indi-
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FIG. 1. This bison cow and her calves-photographed in the 1890s in Canada's Banff National Park-were
among the few remaining buffalo on the Great Plains in the late nineteenth century, as the vast majority had been killed
off by changing ecological conditions and especially human predation. Courtesy of Glenbow Archives, NC-27-11.

ans was the fact that white settlement and
expansion into the Central Plains had pushed
the dwindling herds into Texas, which had
expelled the Comanche from their reservation on the Brazos River in 1859. 15 Caught
between a scarcity of game and the brutal tactics employed by the US Army in defending
railroads and Euro-American settlers, the
Kiowa and Comanche-with estimated populations in the late 1860s of 2,000 and 4,000,
respectively-met several times with federal
representatives, hoping to establish peace and
to chart a course for Native survival. 16
Treaty negotiations also provided Indian
leaders a chance to vent their frustrations with
US policy, as captured in a speech by Eagle
Drinking, a Comanche chief, at the 1865 pro-

ceedings on the Little Arkansas River. In response to Commissioner ]. B. Sanborn's proposal that the Comanche and Kiowa cede lands
north of the Canadian River and accept settlement on a reservation in the Indian Territory,
Eagle Drinking replied: "I am fond of the land
I was born on. The white man has land enough.
I don't want to divide again."17 Nevertheless,
in exchange for a supposedly permanent hunting ground in far northwestern Texas, Eagle
Drinking, among others, signed the treaty on
October 18, 1865.
As the Comanche and Kiowa were to discover, however, peace negotiations often promised more than they delivered. For instance,
while the bands who signed the 1867 Treaty
of Medicine Lodge Creek believed that the
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agreement had guaranteed them exclusive access to the hunting grounds below the Arkansas River, the treaty never expressly forbade
Euro-Americans from entering the area. Thus,
the white hidehunters who poured into the
Texas Panhandle after 1870 drove to the brink
of extinction the very herds of bison on which
the Indians had pinned their own hopes of
self-preservarion. 18
Frustrated by the disappearance of the bison and exasperated by the perceived duplicity of federal officials, as many as two-thirds of
the Kiowa and Comanche-including those
who had previously accepted treaty obligations-ventured into Texas during the late
1860s. While their primary objecti ves no doubt
were bison and the horses needed to hunt them,
many Indians also increased their attacks on
white settlements with the intent of driving
off those who would endanger their access to
the diminishing herds.
These were the bands of raiders so bitterly
described by Euro-Americans along the Texas
frontier in the late 1860s and early 1870s.
Seeking a definitive end to the conflict and
the promotion of further Anglo migration, the
Texas legislature passed a bill in June 1870
authorizing the institution of a "Frontier
Force." This act had the effect of reestablishing the Texas Rangers, who had lapsed into
irrelevance during the Civil War and Reconstruction and were replaced with the state
police by a skeptical Republican administration. 19 Four years later, this detachment of
Rangers was reorganized into the six companies of the Frontier Battalion and charged with
containing "marauding or thieving parties" of
Indians. 20 Their mission was relatively straightforward: to drive Native Americans from
within the borders of the state beyond the
reach of the resources on which their survival
depended.
Considering that after the Civil War the
United States had committed significant military resources to Texas for the purposes of frontier defense-including one artillery, three
cavalry, and four infantry regiments-one is
tempted to ask why state administrators felt it

necessary to resuscitate the Rangers. 21 There
are two answers. In the first place, the Rangers
were revered within Texas as Indian fighters
par excellence, a reputation that dated back
to the brutal campaigns led by Capt. John
Coffee Hays against the Comanche in the
18408. 22 Faced now with a level of Indian violence not seen since those days, Texans looked
to the Rangers once more to deliver them from
"the many tribes of savages" along the frontier, a job for which they seemed uniquely
qualified. 23
Archival records suggest that the Rangers
were indeed well suited to the task of Indian
conquest. For one thing, the overwhelming
majority of the men who served in the Rangers had come to the force from rural parts of
Texas, the Plains states, and the South, and as
such very likely had experience with Native
Americans, something the Rangers themselves
considered of inestimable value. 24 As one captain who fought in west Texas noted: "The US
Troops don't understand the character of these
Indians, nor are they acquainted with the character of the country. My men are all frontiersmen, thoroughly acquainted with the whole
country and well versed in [their] machinations and tactics."25
But beyond their storied history and famed
expertise, the Rangers were called upon by
Austin and celebrated by the citizenry because
they were enthusiastic in executing the state's
Indian policy. For instance, although there
were approximately 4,500 federal troops serving in Texas at any given time after the Civil
War, the 450 Rangers of the Frontier Battalion
engaged Indians in battle on more than onethird as many occasions as their army counterparts between 1865 and 188I.26 Moreover,
though possessing only one-tenth of the army's
manpower in the state, the Rangers killed half
as many Indians as the federal troops did over
the same period (82 to 163, respectively) and
managed to wound two more (26 to 24).17
As important as the reputation of the Rangers was to their reestablishment in the 1870s,
perhaps more significant was the fact that public officials and private citizens alike had little
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faith in the US Army detachments sent to
protect them from Kiowa and Comanche raiders.28 For one thing, Texans were convinced
that the military presence was simply too small
and scattered to make much difference in the
event of an Indian attack. The most frequently
repeated complaint regarded the distance between army posts, which afforded huge gaps
through which Indians could enter the state. 29
Part of the problem, in the eyes of Texas observers, was that authorities in Washington
DC habitually underestimated the Indian dangers along the state's frontiers. To be sure,
federal officials did have their doubts about
the dire conditions reported in Texas, as exemplified by an 1871 visit from Gen. William
T. Sherman to Fort Richardson, which he made
with the express purpose of debunking the
Texans' anxieties. Sherman believed the hysteria little more than a ruse intended to draw
federal troops away from Reconstruction duty,
although he changed his mind after narrowly
escaping a mixed party of Kiowa and Comanche raiders near the Salt Creek Prairie. 30
Perhaps more vexing than the army's apparent inability to defend them, however, was
the sense among many Texans that the federal
government was simply not committed to a
policy of total Indian removal from the state.
For their part, Austin officials in the postCivil War period had clearly determined that
Anglos and Indians could not coexist within
the boundaries of Texas, as evidenced by the
collapse of the state's two reservations within
five years of their 1854 establishment, and the
exile of all remaining Natives to the Indian
Territory.3! Washington, on the other hand,
had settled on President U. S. Grant's so-called
"peace policy," a less confrontational plan that
sought diplomatic solutions to Anglo-Native
conflicts, like the 1867 Treaty of Medicine
Lodge Creek that allowed Indians the right to
hunt buffalo in the Panhandle.
This federal moderation, Texans believed,
had infected the military detachments stationed
in the Southern Plains. Though capable of striking with indiscriminate ferocity-as seen at
the Washita River, Summit Springs, and the
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Marais River-the army seemed just as likely
to display a peculiar quality of restraint. For
instance, soldiers in Texas rarely followed up
their smaller victories with decisive engagements, belying the genocidal bent often ascribed to them by modern historians. 32 Limited
perhaps by the tenets of the peace policy or
preferring instead to wage a war of attrition,
the US Army did not attempt the complete
removal of Indians from the state during the
1870s, and on occasion even allowed Natives
to remain within its borders after the Natives'
defeat in the Red River War of 1874-75. 33
Such decisions drove Texans to distraction,
like the citizens of Donley County, who in
1878 complained to Austin that "the few
United States troops stationed in the Pan
Handle are totally inadequate to cope with
the present danger." Instead of asking for more
US soldiers to come to their relief, however,
the people of Clarendon begged for a Ranger
squad to "aid us in our present distress."34 With
the failure of the Red River War to end the
Indian presence in Texas, state officials heeded
these requests, relying increasingly on the state
police to accomplish what Washington could
not-or would not-do.
As most of the defeated Natives had returned to their agencies in the Indian T erritory by the summer of 1875, federal officials in
the region declared that peace (if perhaps an
uneasy one) reigned in the area. As an indication of Washington's confidence that conflict
on the Southern Plains was over, the army
reduced its troop strength in Texas, diverting
extra forces to the Northern Plains, where the
United States faced stiff opposition from
groups of Sioux, Cheyenne, and Blackfoot
Indians resisting the same white encroachment
that had triggered the Red River conflict.
Texans, however, were not nearly so sanguine about conditions along their northern
and western frontiers, as Indians still crossed
into the state periodically in search of game to
augment their meager rations. For instance,
Judge Emanuel Deibbs of Wheeler County in
the Panhandle wrote to Austin in June 1879
that "a band of Pawnees came through this
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Co. creating a great deal of excitement, and
almost resulting in a serious difficulty with
them."35 Although the Indians returned to
their reservation without incident, the message was clear: the problem of Indians in north
Texas was by no means resolved, despite the
end of the Red River War. 36
The Rangers would certainly have agreed
with this sentiment. Adj. Gen. William Steele
commented that perhaps the only perceptible
difference between the periods before and after the Red River War was that "during the
past year [1875], the Indian raids have been by
small parties, who depended upon their adroitness in concealment, rather than in their
strength, for safety."37 Overall for the period
between August 1875 and December 1877,
Steele reported that fifty-seven Indian parties
had entered the state, killing forty citizens and
making off with nearly 900 horses and mules. 38
Where had all the Natives come from? wondered Texans from Austin to the small towns
scattered along the growing frontier.
As it turned out; many of the Kiowa and
Comanche bands chased by the Rangers had
passed into the state with the consent of soldiers stationed both in Texas and the Indian
Territory. Complaining to military officials of
starvation on their agencies, Indian chiefs
sought permission for hunting parties to cross
the Red River, which by that time was the last
refuge of the bison on the Southern Plains.
The soldiers, motivated in part by expediency-reducing starvation could alleviate the
tensions posed by confinement on the reservations-but also by compassion, often complied with these requests.
Such was the case with Lt. A. M. Patch,
who described his encounter with a band of
Indians near Fort Elliott in 1879. As Patch
explained, the group's leader "complained bitterly of his Agency, saying that his people did
not get enough to eat there, and that he did
not want to go back until he found buffalo
[and that] he did not intend any mischief."
Impressed with their good disposition, Patch
released the Indians on the condition that if
the Indian sent back to the reservation by the

chief for a valid hunting pass did not return,
the group would immediately depart the state. 39
Texans, predictably, complained vociferously about this practice, believing that the
incursions of the Native hunting parties were
merely the prelude to another major conflict
in the region. As one citizen in Brown County
explained to Gov. O. M. Roberts in February
1879, "[T]here was now on Texas soil over
one thousand 'Indians,' pretending that their
mission was 'hunting,'" adding that there was
"great danger of an outbreak, in the Spring, on
our frontier."4o Such threats presented dire
implications for the nascent stock-raising industry of west Texas, which residents hoped
would bind the area to more developed parts
of the state.
For their part, military officials defended
their actions, insisting that settlers greatly
exaggerated both the size and frequency of
such Indian forays while flatly dismissing
Anglo claims of alleged "outrages" committed
by the Natives.4' Although some commanding officers attempted to ameliorate the situation by promising to send military escorts along
with Indian hunting parties, others explained
that troop reductions made this practice largely
infeasible. 42 Bvt. Maj. Gen. John Pope, commander of the Department of the Missouri and
a noted advocate of fair treatment for the Indians, evinced less patience for the Texans'
complaints, explaining that "insufficient subsistence" by the government made bison hunts
"absolutely necessary."43
Abandoned by the federal government,
Austin turned to the Rangers for help in settling the state's Indian question once and for
all. The police did not disappoint, resolving,
it seems, to pursue with ferocity every Native
band trespassing in the state. Such grim determination emerges in an 1878 letter from Lt.
G. W. Arrington, who wrote to Adj. Gen.
John B. Jones, Steele's successor as adjutant
general, that he had heard rumors of several
Indian bands camped just across the state line
in Wilbarger County. Volunteering to intercept them, Arrington added that he was "satisfied we can bring back scalps with US."44
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More significantly, the Rangers aimed to
cut off the Fort Sill Indians from any access to
the state's remaining bison, believing that this
tactic would deter N ati ves from entering Texas
and would cause the federal government to
seal the borders. Jones went so far as to claim
in an 1879 letter that there were no bison or
game of any kind in northwest Texas-surely
an exaggeration-in the hopes that Pope and
his men might put a stop to the crossings. 45
When this failed to solve the problem, the
Rangers adopted more radical measures, which
brought them into direct conflict with Washington and the military establishment.
Tensions ran highest in the Panhandle,
where a small number of whites had established profitable stock-raising operations that
they believed were endangered by the continued Indian presence. Seeking to protect these
ventures by driving off Natives in search of
bison, Ranger detachments squared off against
military officials in the region. One such encounter took place inJ une 1879, when Arrington
traveled to Wheeler County-on the border
between Texas and the Indian Territory-to
investigate the complaints of local ranchers.
Arriving in the town of Sweetwater,
Arrington was accosted by Gen. John W.
Davidson, who accused the Rangers of foolishly trying to bring on "a merciless and useless war." When asked by the general if he
would kill any Natives he encountered,
Arrington replied that he "most assuredly
would if they were armed." Vowing to protect
the Indians of the Panhandle, Davidson said
he would not allow "an armed mob to be travelling through the country," and ordered his
men to fire upon the Rangers if they disturbed
any Natives. 46
Perhaps the most explosive encounter between Rangers and soldiers of the US Army
took place earlier that year. Moved by the
desperate conditions facing a band of Kiowa
and Comanche who had left Fort Sill in search
of food, Nicholas Nolan, a captain in the Tenth
Cavalry, arranged for the group to cross into
Texas with a military escort.47 A squad of Rangers patrolling along the Red River discovered

89

FIG. 2. As commander of the Frontier Battalion
and later as Adjutant General of the State of Texas,
John B. Jones directed many of the Ranger efforts to
remove Native Americans who crossed into the state
during the 1870s. He died in 1881 at age 47. Courtesy
of the Texas State Library and Archives Commission.

the party, and "without any provocation" attacked the Indians-killing Sunboy, a Kiowa
chief-despite the clear presence of the accompanying ten-man military detachment, an
action that set off a bitter quarrel between
Nolan and the Ranger commander. 48
While these efforts were no doubt successful in driving the Indians from Texas, the Rangers received substantial help from both houses
of the U.S. Congress. Troubled by the continuing violence in Texas, and persuaded, perhaps, by the impassioned appeals of the state's
representatives in Washington, Congress approved a bill in the spring of 1880 that expressly prevented reservation Indians from
entering any part of Texas. Most telling was
the sentence that concluded section 1 of the
act, which read, in part, that "any officer or
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agent of the Army or Indian Bureau who shall
violate this law shall be dismissed from the
public service."49
Native Americans did not disappear entirely from the state after 1880, although the
greatly reduced demand for Ranger anti-Indian duty suggests how complete their removal
efforts-with an assist from Congress-had
been. The near-total disappearance of the bison and the continued vigilance of the Rangers had made Texas virtually uninhabitable
for Indians by the dawn of the 1880s, as Adj.
Gen. W. H. King noted in his annual report
for 1882: "Practically, there is very little use
for any Rangers so far as danger from Indian
raids is concerned," a notion that would have
been unthinkable even two years before. 50
To be sure, there were sporadic reports of
Indian sightings by rail crews in west Texas
around this time, but when investigated by
the Rangers-who would stop by the camps
for a day or two-such scouts usually turned
up very little. 51 Ironically, it was this much
less violent Ranger assignment (the supervision of rail camps~ that delivered the final
blow to Native resistance in Texas. By keeping a close watch on track and grading crews
in the trans-Pecos region, the Rangers facilitated the extension of the all-important iron
roads, which brought with them, into even
the farthest reaches of the state, the white
settlers of Austin's aspirations.
At the other end of the Great Plains, Canadian officials in the early 1870s did not face
the same troubling reality of Indian-white
conflict that their Austin counterparts did,
largely because of sparse Euro·Canadian settlement north of the forty-ninth paralle1. 52 Nevertheless, Ottawa's fears of such violence were
hardly less intense, for the augu·st goals of the
new National Policy-especially the construction of a transcontinental railroad and the
promotion of Euro-Canadian migrationwould languish if confronted by systematic
Indian resistance. 53 Before 'settlers could establish homesteads and entrepreneurial ventures on the prairies, Ottawa needed assurance

that white migrants would suffer no harm at
the hands of potentially defensive Natives.
These official concerns were not unfounded,
as suggested by reports arriving in the capital
from Canadians already on the Plains. Although the federal government had laid the
groundwork for peaceful westward expansion
by negotiating treaties in 1871 with bands of
OJ ibwa and Swampy Cree Indians in southern
Manitoba, Ottawa had made few inroads
among the Native groups farther west who
inhabited the territory between Lake Winnipeg
and the Rocky Mountains. These Indians, particularly the Cree and Blackfoot peoples,
deeply resented the growing Euro-Canadian
presence in their midst, and insisted that settlers and surveyors first obtain Native permission before venturing onto their lands.
The Cree Indians, so vehemently opposed
to Canadian expansion, occupied the southeastern Plains of the Dominion's frontier, an
area on either side of the border separating
the present-day provinces of Alberta and
Saskatchewan. Their ancestors had migrated
to this territory from the Great Lakes, and
once on the Plains the woodland Cree acquired
horses and gradually abandoned trapping in
favor of hunting buffalo, which had become
the central element of Cree existence by the
early 1800s. With an 1860 peJpulation of approximately 12,000, the Cree were the largest
single indigenous group on' the Canadian
Plains, and they controlled the fertile hunting
grounds along the Battle and North Saskatchewan rivers,54
The principal rivals of the Cree for both
horses and access to the bison were the estimated 10,000 Indians comprising the three
groups of the Blackfoot Confederacy: the
Blood, Peigan, and Blackfoot proper. 55 Described by one historian as "the strongest and
most aggressive nation on the Canadian prairies" after the mid-eighteenth century, the
Blackfoot cl~itp.ed the area to the southwest of
the Cree hunting grounds, a region that
straddled the international boundary between
the Dominion and the United States. 56 Given
the expansionist ambitions of the Blackfoot
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Confederacy, hostilities with the powerful and
proximate Cree were a regular feature of
Blackfoot life until 1870, when the groups
treated for peaceY
By that time, both the Blackfoot and the
Cree faced greater problems than the horseraiding expeditions launched by one people
against the other. In the first place, in 1869
the Hudson's Bay Company had sold the vast
North- West Territories to the recently
founded Dominion of Canada, leaving the status of the region's Indians in doubt. 58 More
distressing to the Natives, however, was the
rapid decline in the area's bison population,
accelerated-as in the south-by white
hidehunters. Already pressured by the Indians
themselves, as well as the Metis-the mixedblood descendants of European trappers and
Indian women-the once great herds had been
pushed to the far western edge of the Northern Plains by the early 1870s. 59
Keenly aware of the threat to their existence posed by the land transfer and the disappearance of the bison, the Cree and Blackfoot
looked upon white newcomers with great skepticism. As one Hudson's Bay Company trader
explained to the lieutenant governor of the
North-West Territories in 1871, a deputation
of Cree chiefs had come to see him at
Edmonton, where they sought "to ascertain
whether their lands had been sold or not, and
what was the intention of the Canadian Government in relation to them." The trader enclosed a message from Sweet Grass, a Cree
chief, that began inpart, "We heard our lands
were sold and we did not like it; we don't want
to sell our lands; it is our property, and no one
has a right to sell them."60
The Blackfoot were no less concerned by
the growing white encroachment. As explained by Constantine Scollen, an Oblate
priest traveling among the Indians in the mid1870s, "The Blackfeet are extremely jealous
of what they consider their country, and never
allowed any white men, Half-breeds [Metis]'
or Crees to remain in it for any length of time."
Compounding Blackfoot anxieties, Scollen
explained, was the advent of the North-West
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Mounted Police among the Natives, as the
Indians believed that the police had come not
only to establish law and order, "but also to
protect white people against them, and that
this country will be gradually taken from them
without any ceremony."61
Fueled by these anxieties, the Cree and
Blackfoot sought to preserve their nomadic
existence by challenging the outsiders who
arrived in their territory without Native consent and who killed or scared off the dwindling game on which Indian survival depended.
Ottawa, on the other hand, was no less resolved to promote its own agenda for the area,
and turned now to the North-West Mounted
Police for help in resolving the impasse. Unlike the Rangers, however, the Mounties' mission-as described by Deputy Prime Minister
Hewitt Bernard-was essentially a nonviolent
one: "[Tlo give confidence to peaceable Indians and intending settlers."62 This the police
would accomplish through negotiation.
Before considering the role of the NorthWest Mounted Police in facilitating treaties
between Ottawa and the Plains Indians, it is
worth asking why the federal government
chose this approach to begin with, instead of
adopting more confrontational methods. One
factor, at least in western Canada, was the
long history of Hudson's Bay Company control there. Company traders had cooperated
with and supported many Indian groups, which
had served no doubt to foster some degree of
trust between Natives and whites. Ottawa
hoped to capitalize on these relationships as it
extended its power into the prairies. As important was the Canadian government's dedication to the treaty-making process, which as
historian Jill St. Germain explains, had survived largely intact since the days of the Proclamation of 1763. 63
Practical considerations dictated a peaceful plan of action as well. Even had the Canadian government chosen to conduct an
aggressive campaign against the Blackfoot and
Cree, there was a more immediate obstacle
than the Dominion's diplomatic obligations:
Ottawa simply did not have the money needed
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to implement such a strategy. For instance,
during the 1870s the United States spent
nearly $20 million each year on its Indian wars,
but Canada's entire budget for the same period was only $19 million. 64
The Mounties were an obvious choice to
initiate the treaty process, as they were the
Dominion's principal representatives in the
area and had been sent west by Ottawa expressly to make contact with Native groups
and to obviate any possible conflicts between
Indians and whites. 65 Charged now by the government with laying the groundwork necessary for treaty negotiations between Canada
and the Plains Indians, the Mounted Police
sought to establish diplomatic relations with
the Blackfoot and the Cree, and to win the
confidence of the Indians' most influential
chiefs. To that end, the police distributed gifts
of blankets, tobacco, tea, and ammunition. 66
By all accounts, the Mounties' initial efforts were a great success. Describing a meeting between the Mounties and a group of
Blackfoot Indians, Father Scollen exclaimed,
"All honor I say to the 'Mounted Police,' who
have been able to inspire with such confidence
these poor members of humanity." For their
part, according to Scollen, the Indians had
graciously received the hospitality of their
"new white friends, and the assurances of more
peaceful days in future."67
Despite the progress in Canadian-Indian
relations facilitated by the Mounted Police
and the fact that the Cree and Blackfoot had
for several years petitioned Ottawa to meet
with them, many chiefs assumed a diffident
posture when treaty commissioners actually
arrived in the West in 1876 and 1877. As
Alexander Morris, lieutenant governor of the
North-West Territories, explained after receiving several Cree delegations at Fort
Carlton, "[T]hey dreaded the treaty; they had
been made to believe that they would be compelled to live on the reserves wholly, and abandon their hunting."68
Although Morris assured the Indians that
"we [do] not want to take that means ofliving
from you," he went on to sketch a scenario

that would indeed circumscribe, if not eliminate, Cree access to the bison, saying that "if
a man, whether Indian or Half-breed, had a
good field of grain, you would not destroy it
with your hunt."69 Even more unambiguous
indications of the government's designs for
the Plains Indians appeared in the boilerplate
of the "numbered treaties," the accords by
which Canada obtained title to every acre of
the prairies. The wording of the agreements
granted the Indians the right to roam over the
lands they had ceded "excepting such portions
of the territory as pass from the Crown into
the occupation of individuals or otherwise."70
Maintaining access to the hunting grounds,
however, was of little consequence to the Indians if there were no bison on the prairies to
hunt. While many Cree and Blackfoot chiefs
revealed their willingness to try farming if the
bison disappeared, Native leaders made it clear
to the treaty commissioners that they preferred
a nomadic existence for as long as possible
and urged the government to preserve the bison. By the time the governing council of the
North-West Territories took up the matter in
1877-implementing measures aimed at limiting Indian but not necessarily white predation-the herds had dwindled so significantly
that the measure was quickly repealed the following year. 71
In the end, the bison's near-extinction and
the seeming inevitability of white settlement
led many Cree and Blackfoot chiefs to sign
Treaties Number Six and Seven in 1876 and
1877, respectively, despite their misgivings.
In addition to the presents the commissioners
gave them, the Indians were convinced to "sell"
their lands to the government by guarantees
of annuity payments in perpetuity, the supply
of farm implements and requisite agricultural
instruction, as well as promises of education
for Native children. In this way, Ottawa's plans
for inducing Natives to move onto reserves
closely mirrored similar efforts by US officials. 72
Also of critical importance in encouraging the
Indians to sign, it seems, was the role of the
North-West Mounted Police, which had sent
detachments to all of the treaty proceedings.
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Straight-backed and clad in scarlet tunics, their
presence lent prestige and a certain measure
of royal authority to the ceremonies, although
their influence probably derived more from
their own gift offerings and their vigilance in
containing unsavory American traders. As
Crowfoot, leader of the Blackfoot nation, said
during the negotiations for Treaty Number
Seven: "If the Police had not come to the
country, where would we be all now? Bad men
and whiskey were killing us so fast that very
few, indeed, of us would have been left to-day.
The Police have protected us as the feathers of
the bird protect it from the frosts of winter. I
am satisfied. I will sign the treaty."73
Although the completion of the Blackfoot
Treaty in October 1877 had, in effect, severed
the Indians' last remaining link to the Plains,
simply extinguishing Native title in the West
had by no means solved Canada's Indian "problem." After all, Ottawa had promised, albeit
with qualifications, not to impede Native access to bison hunting grounds, and the treaties
made Indian occupation of their allotted reserves strictly voluntary. The drawbacks of
such an arrangement-that is, one in which
the Plains Indians were free to continue a nomadic existence-soon emerged.
Government observers, while recognizing
the Indians' determination to continue hunting bison, knew also that the herds were on
the brink of extinction, and they worried about
managing Canada's indigenous populations
once the buffalo were gone. Considering that
the extension of the Canadian Pacific Railway was imminent, and that with its construction would come thousands of workers and
settlers, the government believed it imperative to eliminate any threat posed by nomadic
Indians to the white newcomers by removing
the Natives from the prairies. Once again,
Ottawa turned to the Mounties, who sought
to end the dependence of the Plains Indians
on the bison.
A critical if seemingly indirect step in this
direction was the Mounties' attempts to eliminate the liquor trade in the North-West Territories, which experienced explosive growth
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FIG. 3. In 1877, as the head chief of the Blackfoot,
Crowfoot helped negotiate Treaty No.7, an agreement
that ceded the southern portion of present-day Alberta
to the new Canadian nation. In his remarks, Crowfoot
noted that the benevolent presence of the Mounted
Police had invested him with the confidence necessary
to sign the accord. Courtesy of the Glenbow Archives,
NC-29-1.

after the Hudson's Bay Company ceded its
lands to Canada in 1869. With no legal injunctions against the sale of alcohol in the
N orth-West Territories, white traders prohibited from selling liquor in Montana poured
across the international boundary and established forts with colorful names such as
"Whoop-Up," "Slide-Out," and "Standoff."74
At the posts, Euro-Americans did a booming
business in buffalo robes, even after the great
herds had started their precipitous decline. 75
Indians supplied many of these hides in exchange for liquor, which introduced great social disorganization in Native communities. 76
Natives intoxicated by vast quantities of
whiskey-often spiced with tobacco, molasses, pepper, and ginger to heighten its effectsdied in horrific numbers, with one missionary
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estimating that forty-two otherwise healthy
Blackfoot men had perished in drunken brawls
or by freezing to death in the winter of 187374 alone. Still, the Indians came regularly to
trade hides for liquor. 77
Concerned by the turbulence in the NorthWest occasioned by alcohol, with the Cypress
Hills Massacre in 1873 only the most notorious example, Ottawa armed the North-West
Mounted Police with a mandate to crush the
region's liquor traffic, which the Mounties
sought to do upon their arrival in the West. 78
Police vigilance, however, had a more practical side to go along with its ostensibly humanitarian objectives. As the minister of
justice explained in an 1874 letter to his counterpart at the ministry of the interior, the liquor trade "has had the effect of demoralizing
the Indians and retarding all efforts toward
civilizing and quieting them," so that "little
can be done towards inducing settlers to go
into that valuable section of the country."79
Given Ottawa's plans for "civilizing and
quieting" the Natives-which involved the
Indians taking up homesteads and learning
how to farm-officials saw that stopping the
liquor trade could go a long way toward weaning Indians off of the bison and thus ending
Native nomadism, as alcohol was a consequence of and continued inducement to the
robe trade. so Morris, in fact, made federal intentions and the importance of the Mounted
Police in implementing those plans explicitly
clear to the Cree in 1876, during the deliberations at Fort Pitt that preceded the signing of
Treaty Number Six. 8!
The Mounted Police worked tirelessly to
extinguish the sale and consumption of alcohol in the North-West Territories throughout
the 1870s. Statistics from the latter part of the
decade, when such record-keeping by the
Mounties began, indicate that liquor-related
offenses constituted a significant percentage
of total police arrests and prosecutions: 13
percent in 1878, 24 percent in 1879, 23 percent in 1880, and 14 percent in 1881. 82 The
majority of these cases concerned the importation of liquor or its sale to Indians, although

the police also went after the Indians themselves. 83
No less important to Ottawa in ending Indian nomadism were the Mounties' efforts to
eliminate horse theft by Indians, especially
raids on Native camps lying across the border
in the United States. For bison-hunting
peoples like the Cree and Blackfoot, horses
were indispensable, as they greatly facilitated
the hunting of bison while allowing Native
bands to transport their families and belongings across vast distances in the Plains. 84 But
beyond these economic motives, horses also
served a social purpose as well. The size of a
Native man's horse herd, as well as the quality
of his mounts, were critical factors in determining a warrior's status in the community.85
In order to build and maintain their herds,
small bands of Cree and Blackfoot warriors
regularly attacked the camps of rival Native
groups. Although they certainly stole from
each other, the Cree and Blackfoot often targeted herds controlled by groups to the south,
in contiguous parts of the United States. The
Cree, for instance, frequently poached from
Mandan and Hidatsa camps located in the
Dakota Territory, while the Blackfoot coveted steeds belonging to the Crow and Flathead, Montana groups who lived to their
southeast and southwest, respectively.86 As
with the horses themselves, these raids served
social as well as economic purposes, for success in warfare lent prestige to young men seeking advancement in their communities.
Mounted Police reports from the late 1870s
and early 1880s confirm the central importance of horse theft to the Indians of the N orthem Plains, and the growing international
dimensions of the raids during this time period. Most vexing to the Mounted Police was
the fact that Canadian Indians considered areas north of the international boundary as
something of a safe haven, referring to the
forty-ninth parallel as the "medicine line," and
believing that they were immune from punishment once they had crossed it. Ottawa worried
that such incidents might be unproductive of
cordial diplomatic relations with Washington. 87
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However, considering that in the overwhelming majority of such cases Indians stole
from other Indians, and with little attendant
violence, one is led to ask why the Mounted
Police worked so hard to eradicate the problem. The answer, it seems, hinges on the recognition by Canadian officials that, as with
the liquor trade, putting a stop to Native horse
theft would severely impair the Indians' ability to maintain a nomadic existence. 88 It stood
to reason that a dearth of horses would clearly
complicate the bison hunt, while simultaneously removing both a means of and further
enticement to Native mobility. Moreover,
denying Indian access to horses obviated their
need to cross the international boundary, serving to further circumscribe the Indians' nomadic behavior.
Ironically, despite the best efforts of the
Mounties in crushing the liquor trade and curtailing Native horse theft, the provisionrather than the denial-of access to the buffalo
spelled the end of Native nomadism in the
Canadian Plains. Following their arrival in the
West, the Mounties used their influence, as
well as the power of federal law, to prevent
conflicts between Native groups. While this
certainly had its positive effects for Cree and
Blackfoot communities, it also precluded them
from defending their hunting grounds from
outsiders such as whites and Metis, a fact noted
with some concern by the Blackfoot in deliberations for Treaty Seven. 89
Whether this was a calculated strategy intended to deprive the Indians of their life
source-akin to the policy of noninterference
adopted by the United States in the 1870s-is
unclear; police sympathy for the Indians' plight
seems to suggest that it was not. 90 What is
certain, however, is that this "tragedy of the
loss of the commons," in combination with
the Mounties' more deliberate attempts to
control Cree and Blackfoot access to the bison, accelerated the economic collapse of
Plains Indian societies in the Canadian West. 91
With few or no bison north of the international boundary after 1881, and rapidly shrinking numbers in the Montana river valleys
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below-where the Indians were forbidden from
hunting, anyway-the Cree and Blackfoot retreated to their reservations and the prairies
fell finally and firmly into Ottawa's possession.9Z
Although there were episodes of Native unrest in Texas and western Canada after the
early 1880s-most notably, Canada's NorthWest Rebellion of 1885, although this was
more an affair of the Metis than either the
Cree or Blackfoot-by that time white settlement and industrial development proceeded
apace at either end of the Great Plains. Observers in both capitals attributed this state of
affairs to their rural police, crediting themin remarkably similar language-as having
served as the "vanguard of civilization."93
There were, however, real and significant
differences between the forces with regard to
their policing of indigenous peoples, the most
obvious of which turns on the Rangers' liberal
use of violence by comparison to Mountie restraint. Several factors may help to explain
this. In the first place, the Mounties arrived
on the prairies in 1874, charged with creating
optimum conditions for white newcomers, well
in advance of their arrival. Moreover, as explained by historian Roger Nichols in his comparative study of Indians in the United States
and Canada, the power of the North-West
Mounted Police to manage both military and
civil affairs may have simplified Ottawa's Indian policy in the West. 94
In Texas, by contrast, the Rangers inherited a tradition of police service based on the
armed protection of a continually expanding
frontier, one long marked by bloody encounters between Anglo-Texans and Native
peoples. Rather than entering portions of north
and west Texas in order to lay the physical,
legal, and diplomatic groundwork necessary
for Euro-American occupation as the Mounties
had done, the Rangers traveled to flashpoints
of conflict along an already settled frontier,
seeking to defend territory that Anglos had
tried to conquer. For Nichols, it is this difference in settlement patterns between the US
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and Canadian Wests that explains-more than
any other factor-the higher levels of violence
in the United States, and not "any superior
policy or more careful handling of Indian-related issues by Canadian officials."95
Perhaps the central feature in explaining
Ranger brutality and Mountie nonviolence
hinges on the fact that one was a state force
and the other a federal one. The Republic of
Texas gained admission to the United States
in full possession of its lands, and after the
failure of its Indian reservations in the 1850s
was free to handle its Native peoples as Austin saw fit. This entailed driving Kiowa and
Comanche into adjacent states and territories, where the Indians then became a problem for Washington to solve.
The Mounted Police, by contrast-as agents
of a federal government committed to larger,
national goals and one keenly aware of the
newfound global scrutiny that came with nationhood-did not have such an aggressive
option at their disposal. Moreover, they were
bound by Ottawa's diplomatic and financial
constraints in their handling of Canada's indigenous peoples. The Mounties could not simply drive the Cree and Blackfoot across the
international boundary into Montana, nor
could they wage a costly and inevitably controversial war against them.
These divergences should not obscure the
powerful similarities linking the efforts of the
two constabularies throughout this period. The
central mandate governing both the Rangers
and the Mounties during the late 1870s and
early 1880s was identical: to prevent Native
populations from interfering with white migration and the establishment of Euro-American military and political authority at their
respective ends of the Great Plains. In each
case, the police focused their efforts on denying Indian access to the bison. The Rangers
accomplished this by closing the borders of
Texas to Indian outsiders and by attempting
to exterminate those Natives who managed to
cross into the state to hunt bison. The
Mounties employed more indirect and less vicious strategies-attacking the liquor trade,

curtailing horse theft, and preventing intertribal warfare-which destabilized Native reliance on the buffalo.
These are critical differences, to be sure.
After all, it is difficult to imagine a Kiowa or
Comanche leader offering the Rangers anything but scorn and hostility, in marked contrast to Crowfoot's effusive praise for the
Mounties at the signing of Treaty Number
Seven. And yet by the mid-1880s, the bleak
conditions of reservation life facing the Kiowa
and Comanche strongly resembled the poverty and starvation afflicting the Blackfoot and
Cree on their reserves. Considering that in
both instances it was largely police vigilance
that had produced such results, the insistence
by many Canadian historians that the NorthWest Mounted Police afforded gentle treatment to the Natives it controlled seems, in
fact, to be no sure thing at all. 96
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